FPC Submission on Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill 2025 

FutureProof Clare has made a submission on the Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill, for consideration of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate, Energy and Environment.  Take a look at our submission below. 

1. Introduction

Futureproof Clare (FPC) is a grassroots environmental justice campaign group with members based in County Clare. We are a not-for-profit entity composed of volunteers. We raise awareness and advocate for a safe and resilient environment, especially around issues relevant to Clare and the Shannon River, as well as in relation to national and international climate and social justice concerns.

FPC is particularly concerned about the proposal to build an LNG terminal including a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) in Cahiracon, Co. Clare. This submission focuses specifically on the Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill and highlights a number of deficiencies in the proposed legislation, including a lack of regard to existing climate legislation and commitments, dysfunctionality and inconsistency with the government’s own justification for a gas storage facility, a lack of due process and consultation, and a disturbing attempt to shift to an authoritarian regime inconsistent with the Irish Constitution.

2. Head 20 – Section 15 of Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015

The Bill lacks regard to the Climate and Low Carbon Development Act (2015) and Paris Agreement in the following ways:

i) The language used in 20.1 of the Bill dilutes or removes any form of accountability in meeting the criteria set out in Section 15 (1) of the Climate and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, which holds a relevant government body accountable for decision-making that secures the objectives of the 2015 Act, as amended to secure the National Climate Objective to achieve a climate neutral economy by 2050. 

ii) Given the lack of consideration of suitable alternatives to the proposed FSRU that would result in or already are resulting in less greenhouse gas emissions than those that would be emitted by the use of the proposed FSRU, if this Bill is passed it would represent a significant work-around from the requirements of the 2015 Act, and therefore undermine (perhaps fatally) the 2015 Act, representing the will of the Oireachtas to address the climate emergency which it declared to exist in May 2019.

iii) The Bill states in Head 20.2: “For the avoidance of doubt, the designated development is deemed to be in compliance with the provisions of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015.” 

iv) This proposed provision is particularly problematic. It has not been specified exactly how the government deems this development to be compliant with the provisions of the 2015 Act. If this Bill is passed with this provision included, it will hand to the Minister the power to ignore the 2015 Act, and to permit without any proper public scrutiny fossil fuel infrastructure which will negate the efforts others make in society to decarbonise. 

v) Ireland signed up to the Paris Agreement and as such is committed to Article 6.4 (a) in said agreement: “To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering sustainable development”. The Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act (2021) states that the Government and Minister will carry out their functions in a manner which is consistent with the Paris Agreement. The Strategic Gas Emergency Bill does not promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, nor does it foster sustainable development. 

vi) Futureproof Clare believes that JOCCEE members are well aware of Professor Robert Howarth’s work that demonstrates that LNG releases at least 33% higher emissions compared to coal. It has also been demonstrated that using natural gas as a “transition fuel” has long-term negative effects which hinder the transition to a sustainable energy system and is a misrepresentation aimed at legitimising climate-wrecking intensive gas development.

3. Head 4 – Designation of Development 

The Strategic Gas Emergency Bill does not propose to legislate for the use of the FSRU only in emergencies

The pretext for the Bill is to create legislation that will allow the state to build an LNG terminal under accelerated implementation for use only in the case of emergencies. According to the Briefing to the Joint Oireachtas Committee presented on January 14, 2026 on the Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill 2025 by an employee in the Department of Climate, Energy and Environment:

A Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve is a state-owned gas storage facility that will provide Ireland with an immediate source of emergency gas in the event of an outage or disruption to Ireland’s current gas supply.

This state-led strategic reserve will store LNG for use only in the event of a disruption to gas supplies to protect Ireland’s citizens, economy and reputation from the possibility of

energy curtailments.

We see the following dysfunction in this approach:

i) The Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill is not commensurate with a Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve (SGER). The Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill de facto proposes the accelerated implementation of a FSRU, which is not the same as a SGER. A SGER, by definition, is only for use in emergencies. However, the Bill does not propose to legislate a FSRU only for use in emergencies. 

ii) The infrastructure referred to in the Bill is an FSRU that will need to be supplied with gas six times per year in order for the gas to remain viable, according to a government press release. Because gas is unstable in liquid form, liquid natural gas facilities need to undergo a regasification process which means the gas in the tank is used and refilled, thus creating more demand for LNG in Ireland (a demand that does not currently exist). The Bill does not propose to legislate to limit the number of times that the FSRU would be refilled and therefore fails to allow for the building of a Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve. 

iii) The Bill does not limit the number of LNG terminals that can be built under the proposed legislation, neither state-led, nor commercial.

4. Head 17 – Decision of Minister 

(also refers to Head 21. Deemed MAC applying to designated development; Head 23. Compulsory Purchase Orders; and Head 29. Consequential Amendments to Other Acts)  

i) There is no legitimate reason for the Minister alone to make the decision about any piece of infrastructure and to override the authority already invested by the Oireachtas in the national planning body, An Coimisiún Pleanála (ACP). 

According to ACP website:

An Coimisiún Pleanála is responsible for the determination of appeals, direct applications for strategic infrastructure development cases and certain other matters under the Planning and Development Act (2000 and 2024 as amended), and associated legislation. It is also responsible for dealing with proposals for the compulsory acquisition of land by local authorities and others under various enactments. The Commission also has functions to determine appeals under the Local Government (Water Pollution) Acts and the Building Control Acts.

ii) The Minister is an elected representative and while they are responsible for Climate, Energy and Environment, they are not designated as the decision-maker for CPO’s, SID’s or indeed Maritime Area Consents (MACs). The Maritime Area Regulation Authority (MARA) has already been designated by the Oireachtas for making decisions on MACs.  The proposal in the Bill to render the current and future Ministers as the sole decision-maker for one particular type of Strategic Infrastructure Development overrides current legislation, and represents a dangerous and unnecessary shift towards authoritarianism. 

iii) The Planning and Development Act 2000 was amended in 2006 to provide for direct applications to be made to An Coimisiún Pleanála (ACP) for the provision of gas infrastructure.  There is no legitimate reason why this development should be carved out from the requirements to make a direct application to ACP as was intended.  

iv) Indeed FPC perceives that this Bill is a ‘Trojan Horse’ to allow the government to bypass the Planning and Development Act for developments which they deem important, and which would otherwise breach the 2015 Act. FPC considers that the Bill may be modelled on the “Building Canada Act”, which has been much criticised in Canada and is subject to legal challenge. Undoubtedly, in FPC’s view this Bill similarly will be subject to legal challenge if enacted. 

5. Lack of due process and consultation: lack of regard to Aarhus Convention (2012)

i) DCEE’s role is to support the realisation of Ireland’s long-term objective of creating a climate-neutral, sustainable, and economically prosperous Ireland, by collaboratively delivering policies and programmes to empower people, communities, and businesses to continue the transition to a better quality of life for current and future generations. The Bill proposes

ii) Ireland ratified the Aahrus Convention in 2012 meaning that the public has a right to effective participation in environmental matters. The outcome of public participation should be taken into account in decision making. Under the proposed legislation, with the removal of the ordinary ACP procedure, there will be no public participation in the planning process of a major environmental project. This represents a worrying trend of democratic erosion in the Irish planning system, after the 2024 Planning and Development Act restricted access to public participation in decision making. The Irish constitution affirms that Ireland is a “sovereign, independent, democratic state”. However, the proposed legislation represents an erosion of democracy in environmental decision making and an undermining of the sovereignty of the Irish people. 

6. Recommendations

We urge the Committee to reject this proposed legislation. Fossil fuel infrastructure in FPC’s view should not be proposed. IIf it must be proposed, then it should be through the existing planning process, and subject to democratic security and independent oversight.  Crucially it must be subject to independent oversight, including potential review by the Courts in the last analysis for its compliance with the requirements of the 2015 Low Carbon and Development Act. 

7. Conclusion

FPC strongly objects to this legislation.  We believe that it erodes democratic accountability and oversight through our planning system which has generally served the people of the State well since its inception in 1963.  That system rightly provides for independence from the Executive in the making of planning decisions, and provides for local democratic input through the Development Plan process.